Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem by Berry, Sharon
Coincidence Avoidance and Formula1ng the Access Problem 
Sharon E. Berry <seberry@invariant.org> 
In this paper, I discuss a trivializa:on worry for Hartry Field’s official 
formula:on of the access problem for mathema:cal realists, which was 
pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by 
Jus:n Clarke-Doane). I argue that various aMempted reformula:ons of the 
Benacerraf problem fail to block trivializa:on, but that access worriers can 
beMer defend themselves by s:cking closer to Hartry Field’s ini:al informal 
characteriza:on of the access problem in terms of (something like) general 
epistemic norms of coincidence avoidance. 
1. Introduction 
In “Mathema:cal Truth” (1973), Benacerraf presents a dilemma which includes the following classic 
worry for realists about mathema:cal objects—what is some:mes called the access problem. He argues 
that a certain causal constraint on knowledge, together with mathema:cal realism, implies that human 
knowledge of mathema:cs would be impossible. Many philosophers have been deeply moved by 
something about this worry (and analogous concerns in related domains), even while rejec:ng the 
specific premises employed in Benacerraf’s argument (Field 1980; Linnebo 2006). However, a sa:sfactory 
formula:on of this access worry has proved elusive. 
In the first half of this paper, I’ll review Hartry Field’s informal characteriza:on of the access 
problem as arising from realists’ (apparent) commitment to a match between human beliefs and realist 
facts, which cries out for explana:on, and their (apparent) inability to provide such an explana:on. I’ll 
then discuss various aMempts (by Field and others) to elaborate on this core idea by fixing on a single fact 
about human accuracy/reliability, , which the mathema:cal realist must explain. I will note that these 
formula:ons face a trivializa:on problem (pointed out by Øystein Linnebo and recently emphasized by 
the work of Jus:n Clarke-Doane and David Enoch)  involving the apparent existence of explana:ons for 1
the (supposedly explana:on requiring) fact R which do nothing to address intui:ve access worries. And I 
R
Clarke-Doane argues that access worries should be rejected because they can’t be sa:sfactorily 1
formulated in a way that doesn’t allow for trivializing response (2017). In contrast Enoch (2010) takes 
access worries seriously but argues that certain apparently trivializing responses can answer it.
will argue that exis:ng aMempts to solve this trivializa:on problem (by changing or clarifying the fact R to 
be explained) fail. 
In the second half of this paper, I’ll advocate s:cking much more closely to Field’s original 
informal proposal when characterizing the access problem. Specifically, I’ll argue that access worriers can 
reasonably state their concern (and reduce their confidence in realism un:l a solu:on can be found), 
without aMemp:ng to “cash this worry out” in various ways which have been presumed to be necessary 
in the literature. Specifically, access worriers needn’t (and shouldn’t) iden:fy the access worry with a 
mere demand to coherently explain some reliability fact R. They also don’t need to provide a nontrivial 
conceptual analysis of the no:on of coincidence or an uncontroversially applicable criterion for being a 
coincidence. 
Instead, they should simply formulate the access problem as follows. A realist theory of some 
domain (such as mathema:cs or morals) faces an access problem to the extent that adop:ng this theory  2
would require posi:ng some “extra” coincidence  (about the match between human beliefs and reality), 3
beyond those required by compe:ng, less realist, approaches to the same domain. This unambi:ous 
formula:on ar:culates the part of Field’s proposal which almost everyone accepts, while avoiding the 
extraneous philosophical commitments (e.g., to a causal theory of reference, or a par:cular analysis of 
coincidence, or a single explanandum at issue in access worries) which have bedeviled previous 
proposals. 
Understanding the access problem in this way (i.e., via direct appeal to no:ons of coincidence 
and coincidence avoidance) has some other important advantages. For example, it lets us aMrac:vely 
explain philosophers’ failure to find a single reliability claim R such that explaining R suffices to banish 
access worries. And it clarifies what goes wrong with certain intui:vely unsa:sfying trivializing responses 
to access worries, which explain away one apparent coincidence involving human accuracy by appealing 
More specifically, adop:ng this claim together with typical claims about the extent of human knowledge 2
regarding this domain seems to require posi:ng some such coincidence.
Some might argue that not all coincidences cry out for explana:on, and only the laMer tell against a 3
theory in the way that gives force to an access worry. I’m not sure if that is correct, but I take no posi:on 
on this issue here. For the sake of brevity, I will con:nue to talk simply about coincidences with the 
understanding that I mean coincidences which cry out for explana:on.
to another. 
I will conclude by responding to some objec:ons. First, one might object that we need to go 
beyond my unambi:ous formula:on of the access problem if we hope to resolve philosophical disputes 
over the access problem. However, I argue that we can charitably state, and even plausibly hope to solve, 
disputes about the access problem in philosophy of mathema:cs without providing a further conceptual 
analysis of the access problem (or even the relevant no:on of coincidence). 
Second, one might suggest (as Clarke-Doane (2017) appears to) that intui:ve dissa:sfac:on with 
trivializing explana:ons of human accuracy about realist mathema:cs and morals shows that our 
coincidence avoidance intui:ons become unreliable when applied to theories involving necessary truths. 
But I argue that this principle should be rejected because accep:ng it would require junking an important 
and apparently fruicul part of current mathema:cal prac:ce. 
2. Field’s formula1on of the access problem and trivializa1on worries 
2.a Field’s formulation of the access problem 
Let me begin by reviewing Hartry Field’s approach to the access problem, and the trivializa:on worries 
which have arisen for it. 
In Realism, Mathema4cs and Modality (1989), Field suggests that we should think of the access 
problem for mathema:cal realists as arising from a challenge for the realist to “explain how our beliefs 
about [mathema:cal objects] can so well reflect the facts about them” in some internally coherent 
fashion. He notes that, “[I]f it appears in principle impossible to explain this [match between our beliefs 
and reality], then that tends to undermine . . . belief in mathema:cal en::es, despite whatever reason 
we might have for believing in them.” I will develop and defend this core proposal in what follows. 
However, Field elaborates this core idea in a way that (I will suggest) raises concerns about 
triviality. He argues that realists are commiMed to holding that, “for most mathema:cal sentences”  the 
following reliability R claim holds (we will discuss other ways of understanding this reliability claim 
below), and that some explana:on for the truth of R must be possible. 
R: Reliably, if mathema:cians accept that “ ,” then . 
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
Typical mathema:cal realists seem commiMed to accep:ng the above reliability claim.  But, Field 4
suggests, it appears in principle impossible for the realist to give any sa:sfactory explana:on for . And 
this fact casts doubt on the truth of realism. 
This account of the access problem has obvious appeal. It has been used (with some minor 
modifica:ons) to ar:culate access worries concerning other domains like morals and metaphysical 
possibility.  Unlike Benacerraf’s original access worry, Field’s formula:on does not depend on any 5
conten:ous assump:ons about causal constraints on knowledge. Furthermore, Field’s formula:on 
appears to reveal an internal tension within the (typical) realist’s total web of beliefs. It thereby 
vindicates the common intui:on that access worries are different from (and more troubling than) mere 
skep:cism . 6
I think Field is quite right that the mathema:cal realist faces strong epistemic pressure to explain 
R, and that dispelling the impression that they can’t do so is a necessary condi:on for dissolving access 
worries. However, we will see that explaining R is plausibly not sufficient to answer access worries. So 
R
 Field (1989) writes that the Platonist’s commitment to accep:ng this reliability claim is “beyond serious 4
ques:on.” And Linnebo (2006) buMresses this idea by appealing to a connec:on between reliability and 
knowledge as follows. AdmiMedly, a thinker could have significant true mathema4cal beliefs without this 
kind of reliability. However, such a person would not qualify as having knowledge. For example, a “lucky 
fool” who decides whether or not to believe mathema:cal statements on the basis of a coin toss, and 
winds up with many true beliefs in this way, would (plausibly) not count as knowing these mathema:cal 
statements. However, the realist does take us to have knowledge. So they are commiMed to the stronger 
claim that we have reliable true belief, unlike the lucky fool.
Just as it seems mysterious that our mathema:cal intui:ons match objec:ve facts about (say) platonic 5
mathema:cal objects or proof transcendent coherence facts, it can seem mysterious that our a priori 
intui:ons about goodness, beauty, or what Lewissian possible worlds exist match objec:ve facts.
It’s not just that the access worrier can’t jus:fy their mathema:cal beliefs from indubitable premises 6
which the skep:c accepts, but that their account of human accuracy seems troubling from their point of 
view. Also, note that the Fieldian access problem seems to point out a tension within the (typical) moral 
realist’s total web of beliefs (including, e.g., various uncontroversial scien:fic and historical claims, and 
the idea that we have many true beliefs about moral topics), not within moral realism itself. A realist 
could (in principle) avoid Field’s access problem by denying that we have any true moral beliefs or 
knowledge, but this fact provides liMle comfort to any actual moral realists.
although Field’s core approach is right and his further argument highlights crucial issues, it would be a 
mistake to take the final step of iden:fying access worries with an inability to explain R. 
2.b Safety and the trivialization problem 
To see why explaining R (the fact that “Reliably, if mathema:cians accept that ‘ ,’ then ”) seems 
insufficient to answer access worries, let’s consider a few different ways of cashing this claim out. 
One popular approach (Clarke-Doane 2014, 2017) is to read R as demanding that our 
mathema:cal beliefs be “safe” in the sense that they could not have easily been wrong, i.e., 
mathema:cians’ belief-forming methods would not have lead them to form false beliefs at any suitably 
close possible worlds. 
In all sufficiently close possible worlds if mathema:cians believe that then  
Another possibility, which Field men:ons as a fallback op:on, is to drop the appeal to reliability 
and simply say that the actual abundance of true mathema:cal beliefs and lack of false mathema:cal 
beliefs is something for which the realist owes us an explana:on. 
But if one takes either of these approaches, then (as Øystein Linnebo [2006] and Jus:n Clarke-
Doane [2017] have separately noted) it seems like one can “trivially” explain the relevant form of 
reliability using other premises which the realist accepts, as follows: 
TRIV: Mathema:cians reliably believe truths because they reliably believe only those 
mathema:cal claims which can be validly derived from a certain collec:on of mathema:cal 
ϕ
Rsafet y  ϕ  ϕ
necessary truths  7
TRIV seems to explain the safety of our mathema:cal beliefs. For, as it’s robustly the case that 
mathema:cians form mathema:cal beliefs entailed by , they will con:nue to form mathema:cal beliefs 
entailed by in all relevantly close possible worlds. And all proposi:ons entailed by proposi:ons in  are 
necessary truths. Hence all these close possible worlds will be ones in which they con:nue to form 
mostly true mathema:cal beliefs, thereby explaining the safety of our mathema:cal beliefs. One might 
think of TRIV as explaining safety via the fact that if our mathema:cal methods are accurate, then those 
methods are necessarily so. And TRIV also seems to explain (at least in some sense) our possession of 
many true and few false mathema:cal beliefs (in the actual world), by poin:ng out that we arrive at 
mathema:cal beliefs by reasoning validly from true axioms. 
However, it is equally clear that ci:ng TRIV does nothing to assuage intui:ve access worries. This 
suggests that intui:ve access worries cannot be reduced to the need to explain either the safety of our 
mathema:cal beliefs or the fact that we have many true and few false mathema:cal beliefs. 
Now Field could, obviously, respond to this objec:on by denying that TRIV cons:tutes a genuine 
explana:on for R (or for our possession of many true and few false mathema:cal beliefs). And this idea 




One might object that this version of Linnebo’s trivializing explana:on doesn’t account for our true 7
belief in the consistency of ZFC (or in the arithme:cal sentence CON(ZFC)). However, I think one can 
naturally extend the trivializing explana:on to explain our true belief in Con(ZFC) as follows. If we only 
need to explain R for most mathema:cal claims encountered in normal mathema:cal prac:ce, it 
suffices to let consist of ZFC plus all finite iterates of the CON operator (i.e., ZFC + CON(ZFC) + CON(ZFC 
+ CON(ZFC)) . . .). Of course, it is probably true that, for some computable ordinals , we believe 
 (where indicates itera:ng the CON operator many :mes). However, our inability to 
know which puta:ve computable ordinals are truly well ordered prevents this chain from con:nuing 
indefinitely. So one can give a similar explana:on for our accuracy about even claims derivable from 
these infinitary iterates of the CON operator. Namely, there is some computable ordinal  (though not 
one who we recognize any descrip:on of as a computable ordinal) such that the -itera:on of CON 
applied to ZFC is both true and entails all the iterated CON sentences we accept.
Σ
α
CONα(ZFC ) CONα α
β
β
However, many readers (like Linnebo and Clarke-Doane) seem to have the opposite intui:on. 
And I think it is ul:mately hard to deny that TRIV provides some kind of an explana:on of R. For we can 
easily imagine nonphilosophical contexts where TRIV would cons:tute an excellent response to an 
explanatory demand: an anthropologist could explain why some newly discovered community is reliable 
about mathema:cs/ that is explain why the community reliably had so many true and so few false 
mathema:cal beliefs by showing that all their mathema:cal reasoning can be reconstructed in terms of 
some formal system and then no:ng that this system is sound.  So, in the absence of further sharpening 8
of the intui:ve no:on of explana:on (something Field doesn’t provide), it appears that TRIV does explain 
R and access worries cannot be reduced to the need to explain R. 
Note, also, that one cannot defend Field’s account of the access problem by rejec:ng TRIV 
merely on the grounds that it assumes the theorems of  are true in a realist sense (e.g., correctly 
describe the platonic objects) which philosophers pressing an access worry wouldn’t accept because this 
doesn’t prevent TRIV from being an internally coherent explana:on from the realist’s perspec:ve of our 
accuracy about mathema:cs. One of the great benefits of Field’s proposal was that it appeared to reveal 
an internal problem for realism, not just a skep:cal worry. Thus, it suffices for the realist to give an 
internally coherent explana:on. 
2.c Interpreting R more demandingly 
One natural thought is to interpret the “reliability” invoked in Field’s R more demandingly, and use this as 
a basis for rejec:ng TRIV. 
Suppose we grant that TRIV explains why there aren’t any extremely close possible words at 
which mathema:cians’ beliefs are massively false. If we read Field’s reliability claim R more demandingly
—as requiring mathema:cians to be accurate in a larger sphere of close possible words including 
somewhere they don’t form beliefs via —then we can s:ll resist the claim that TRIV explains R.  9
It’s not immediately obvious that the realist is commiMed to the truth of such a demanding 
Σ
Σ
Such explana:on would admiMedly be par:al, but that doesn’t prevent it from being an explana:on. As 8
David Lewis (1986) notes, everything we give is a par:al explana:on: the accident occurred because of 
the bald :re, because of the driver’s slipshod maintenance, etc.
This corresponds to individua:ng our methods more broadly.9
version of R. Rigorously defending this approach would require arguing that the realist is commiMed to 
some specific and much higher degree of reliability, and I haven’t seen anyone do this.  10
But I won’t dwell on this hurdle, as I think a deeper problem is lurking. The problem is that we 
can imagine discoveries which would imply and (in a sense) explain even very modally robust agreement 
between human psychology and realist facts about something like math or morals, while s:ll leaving 
intui:ve access worries untouched. Thus, a more demanding interpreta:on of R is incapable of rescuing 
Field’s elabora:on of his core intui:ons. 
For example, consider the classic moral realist, who takes our beliefs about permissible favori:sm 
toward rela:ves to be “robustly objec:vely correct” in a sense which implies that creatures apparently 
inclined to advocate and prac:ce a different degree of favori:sm would have false beliefs about morality 
(rather than true beliefs about some other no:on “shmorality” of equal metaphysical status). Moral 
realists of this stripe intui:vely face an access worry about the accuracy of our moral beliefs.  Now 11
imagine such a moral realist aMemp:ng to address access worries by giving the following kind of 
explana:on of our accuracy about permissible favori:sm facts. 
EV-MOR: It is a robust fact that in all circumstances conducive to the evolu:on of 
intelligence, natural selec:on favors the trait of advoca:ng and valuing as being twice as 
generous with immediate family as with other individuals. Furthermore, it is morally correct 
to be (exactly) twice as generous with family, and this is a necessary truth. 
This story certainly seems to provide some kind of explana:on for our accuracy about moral facts 
in a very wide range of possible worlds, yet considering it does nothing to answer intui:ve access 
This is a version of the famous “generality problem” for reliablist epistemologies (Goldman and Beddor, 10
2016).
Note that even imperfect moral accuracy (at a rate substan:ally beMer than chance) can give rise to 11
such an access worry.
worries.  This is not just because the genealogy of morals suggested above is probably false. For even if 12
we imagine that the evolu:onary/game theory part of EV-MOR were unques:onably true and gesng at 
a deeply reliable law of nature, considering EV-MOR would s:ll do nothing to address intui:ve access 
worries. Thus, Field’s official formula:on of the access problem can’t be rescued by increasing the level of 
reliability (in the sense of safety) which is to be explained. 
2.d Sensitivity and counter-possible conditionals 
A different strategy for understanding the reliability claim in Field’s R is to appeal to metaphysically 
impossible worlds. 
Employing metaphysically impossible worlds has liMle effect on safety.  However, it does give 13
teeth to sensi:vity requirements (another popular way of thinking about reliability). Sensi:vity demands 
that if hadn’t been true, we wouldn’t have believed (i.e., in the closest possible worlds where isn’t 
true, we don’t believe ). Our mathema:cal beliefs are trivially sensi:ve if we interpret this requirement 
using regular Lewisian counterfactuals (because there are no possible worlds where they are false). 
However, demanding that realists explain sensi:vity at metaphysically impossible worlds 
promises to let us reject explana:ons like TRIV and EV-MOR. For the fact that mathema:cians reliably 
tend to accept proposi:ons derivable from certain necessarily true axioms doesn’t appear to explain why, 
in metaphysically impossible worlds where these axioms are false, we would s:ll wind up having true 
ϕ  ϕ  ϕ 
ϕ
A similarly unsa:sfying example explana:on can be developed in the case of mathema:cs.  12
EV-MATH: The only way for intelligence to evolve involves having a composi:onal language, and 
the only way that mathema:cs-like prac:ces ever arise involves fluke reusing the brain structures 
which compute gramma:cality to produce asser:ons about certain mathema:cal structures, and 
it just so happens that these correspond to the platonic mathema:cal objects which actually 
exist.
As Jus:n Clarke-Doane points out, even if we allow that “impossible worlds” where mathema:cal facts 13
are different can in principle be relevant to truth condi:ons for counterfactuals, it would seem that 
these worlds would be very remote from the actual one. So it’s not clear why explaining reliability 
should require showing that mathema:cians’ beliefs would con:nue to express truths in these very 
remote possible worlds (2017).
mathema:cal beliefs. Indeed, such explana:ons seem to suggest that if mathema:cs/morals had been 
different, then our beliefs would have been just the same (because these beliefs are shaped by unrelated 
evolu:onary/game-theore:c/anatomical considera:ons). 
However, this approach faces very serious problems. First, there are reasons for doub:ng that we 
have any coherent shared grip on the closeness rela:on for metaphysically impossible scenarios (aka 
“counterpossible condi:onals”). For example, if  would  s:ll sa:sfy the usual induc:ve 
defini:on? If not, how would things be different? Despite advances in understanding the logic of 
counterpossible condi:onals (Nolan 1997), we s:ll face significant uncertainty (or perhaps conceptual 
underdetermina:on) concerning the substan:ve closeness rela:on on impossible worlds.  Given this 14
uncertainty, cashing out informal access worries in terms of a demand to explain counterpossible 
condi:onals doesn’t seem very helpful. 
A second problem for this approach is that the counter-possible sensi:vity requirement seems to 
fail (or counter-possible sensi:vity seems hard to explain) in many cases which are intui:vely 
unproblema:c. For example, if bachelors were unmarred women rather than unmarried men, would we 
s:ll believe that bachelors are unmarried men?  Presumably, there is no reason to doubt our knowledge 15
of bachelorhood facts, and this calls into ques:on this interpreta:on of the sensi:vity requirement 
above.  16
2 + 2 = 5 +
Or the substan:ve closeness rela:on which would be relevant to this aMempt to formulate access 14
worries, if there is some kind of context dependence as David Lewis has suggested (1986b).
Jus:n Clarke-Doane (2017) gives a somewhat more complicated example along these lines: If the facts 15
about what configura:ons of maMer cons:tuted a chair were different, would our beliefs be different?
A third problem for cashing out the access worrier’s demand in terms of any sensi:vity demand is 16
pointed out by Donaldson (2014). Imagine someone who forms the belief that none of her colleagues’ 
loMery :ckets will win based merely on the fact that there are a million other :ckets in some loMery and 
only one that will win. Her beliefs may well not be sensi:ve: had one of her colleagues won the loMery 
she would have s:ll expected them to lose. Yet her accuracy will not be mysterious or coincidental or 
give rise to any kind of intui:ve access problem. Thus, explaining human accuracy in Field’s sense should 
not require sensi:vity.
3. Linnebo and alterna1ve languages 
Now let us turn to a variant on Field’s R suggested by Øystein Linnebo (2006). Linnebo discusses a version 
of the problem for cashing out R in terms of sensi:vity noted above. He then highlights a different kind of 
“counterfactual dependence of people’s disposi:on to accept mathema:cal sentences upon those 
sentences being true” (566), which might be relevant to access worries. 
Specifically, he proposes that a good strategy for answering access worries could involve 
defending a metaseman:c claim along the following lines. 
If mathema:cal sentences (like “ ) had not expressed truths, then 
mathema:cians wouldn’t have accepted them. 
In terms of possible worlds,  asserts that the closest possible worlds in which linguis:c 
differences ensure that the sentence “ ” expresses a falsehood are ones in which 
mathema:cians no longer accept this sentence.  Thus, we can think of as spelling out the sensi:vity 17
requirement from the prior sec:on using counterfactuals about seman:c facts instead of metaphysically 
impossible worlds to spell out the sensi:vity requirement from the prior sec:on. 
Now  might seem like a promising candidate for the reliability claim R in Field’s formal 
proposal.  For, intui:vely, TRIV seems bad because the connec:on between the two sides of the 18
explanandum look fortuitous. In many cases, one can dis:nguish this kind of fortuitous agreement by 
looking to counterfactual sensi:vity. But, as we have seen, a straighcorward counterfactual sensi:vity 
analysis runs into problems with metaphysically necessary claims. Thus, one might be inclined to turn to 
RMS 2 + 2 = 4"
RMS
2 + 2 = 4
RMS 
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So, for example, mathema:cians in this world don’t assent to this sentence in conversa:on or place it 17
into textbooks.
Linnebo does not commit himself to this claim. He merely suggests that a good answer to access 18
worries could take the form of an explana:on for , not that any explana:on for why  is true 
would suffice to answer access worries.
RMS RMS
Linnebo’s linguis:c counterfactual for a more sa:sfactory account. 
However, Linnebo’s counterfactual faces its own trivializa:on problem as well as an over-
demandingness problem. The trivializa:on worry arises as follows.  It’s hard to be confident about what 19
the closest possible words at which “ ” doesn’t express a truth look like—something which 
might already be cited as an inconvenient aspect of Linnebo’s view. But to the extent that I grasp this 
no:on at all, it seems it might well be that the closest possible worlds where “ ” doesn’t 
express a truth are ones where some superficial and recent change in language/orthography went 
differently. However, we can explain why mathema:cians at these worlds don’t accept “ ” in an 
intui:vely unsa:sfying fashion just by ci:ng the principle that when linguis:c/orthographic changes are 
made, people adjust what sentences they endorse accordingly. 
For example, these closest possible worlds might well be ones where the transi:on from Roman 
numerals to Arabic numerals went differently so that the symbol “ ” was used to mean “  in most of the 
western world, for note that the history of such worlds could be exactly like that of the actual world up to 
this orthographic change. And it seems imaginable that a rather small copying error (a Lewisian “minor 
miracle”) propagated by a few monks at some key boMleneck in communica:on between the Arabic 
numeral and Roman numeral using mathema:cal communi:es could have produced such a difference in 
orthography (and, hence, in the meaning and truth value of the relevant sentence).  20
So plausibly we can explain why we wouldn’t have accepted “ ” in a world where “ ” 
named “3” (in English) as follows. In these possible worlds, at the :me that the transi:on to Arabic 
numerals occurred, speakers were reliably disposed to confidently reject sentences using Roman 
numerals to express the proposi:on . Thus, the principle that (considered, confident) views 
aren’t affected by changes in orthography explains why people in those worlds didn’t accept “ ” 
immediately following the change in orthography, and simple iner:a explains why later genera:ons 
2 + 2 = 4
2 + 2 = 4
2 + 2 = 4
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2 + 2 = 4 2
3 + 3 = 4
2 + 2 = 4
I am indebted to Warren Goldfarb for forma:ve conversa:ons on this point.19
I don’t know how plausible it is that just few transcrip:on errors of this type could have resulted in this 20
difference. But I take that detail not to maMer much for my argument because it would be bad enough if 
Linnebo’s formula:on implied that had our choice of symbols (or words) been so highly con:ngent there 
would be no access problem or access worries would be trivially solvable.
con:nued to reject them. 
Pusng this together gives us the following explana:on for . Plausibly, the closest possible 
worlds where “2 + 2 = 4” expresses a falsehood are ones where this is so just because of some change in 
orthography (e.g., where “2” is adopted as the name for “3” instead of 2, so “2 + 2 = 4” expresses the 
mathema:cal falsehood “3 + 3 = 4”). But such changes in orthography don’t tend to change what 
proposi:ons people accept.  So, given that people were disposed to reject 3 + 3 = 4 when working with 21
Roman numerals, they’d likely con:nue to reject it axer adop:ng (this modified version of the) Arabic 
numerals and intellectual iner:a could explain why later genera:ons would con:nue to reject it.  This 22
explana:on is unsa:sfying because it explains peoples’ accuracy about mathema:cs at a later :me 
simply by appeal to their accuracy about mathema:cs at an earlier :me, plus a principle of con:nuity 
regarding their beliefs. 
More generally, Linnebo’s condi:onal seems to be poten:ally explicable via the “deeper,” 
unsa:sfying explana:ons for human accuracy about mathema:cal/moral facts discussed in the previous 
sec:on. For instance, EV-MOR asserted that evolu:on and game theory determine that intelligent 
creatures are overwhelmingly likely to treat a certain amount of favori:sm as permissible, and that ra:o 
of permissible favori:sm also happens to be objec:vely correct. Now imagine discovering that 
evolu:onary and psychological mechanisms gave us moral sen:ments matching this game-theore:c ideal 
in a way that was very counterfactually robust. So, for example, smallish changes to the human 
evolu:onary environment would have made liMle difference to the moral sen:ments with which we 
RMS
RMS
That is, people iden:fy what sentences in the new system correspond to the sentences they accepted 21
in the old orthography and accept those in the new orthography.
One might worry that because we oxen do change beliefs when they turn out to produce prac:cally 22
harmful results, the person responding to (this version of) the access problem is on the hook to explain 
why rejec:ng the sentence “2 + 2 = 4” doesn’t cause harmful outcomes. However, one can respond to 
this concern by extending the explana:on to include the fact that rejec:ng the sentence “3 + 3 = 4” 
doesn’t seem to lead to prac:cal difficul:es in the actual world and arguing that the similar inferen:al 
role played by “2 + 2 = 4” in a world with the orthographic change in ques:on suffices to explain the lack 
of prac:cal difficul:es as a result of rejec:ng “2 + 2 = 4” and, thus, explain why it would con:nue to be 
rejected in such a world.
wound up. And a human raised in almost any environment where they could learn to talk, survive to 
adulthood, etc. would be very likely to form some concept with the ac:on-guiding role which we assign 
to permissibility and have similar intui:ons to the ones we do about how this concept applies. 
Learning that our moral sen:ments were robust in this way would make it very plausible that, if 
language had been different (so other moral sentences had expressed truths), we would s:ll have been 
disposed to accept the same moral proposi4ons (and hence, from the realist point of view) s:ll accepted 
true moral proposi:ons. Thus, it would provide a direct explana:on for Linnebo’s counterfactual. But it 
would do nothing to assuage access worries. Assuming EV-MOR is true, the closest worlds where 
“helping friends twice as much as strangers is permissible” expresses a falsehood would plausibly be 
ones where our language is different (rather than our moral sen:ments) so that we don’t accept this 
sentence (and Linnebo’s metaseman:c variant on the sensi:vity requirement is sa:sfied). Thus, if EV-
MOR were true, it would plausibly explain  (as well as Field’s ) without answering intui:ve access 
worries. 
This caveat raises the issue of what kind of grip we have on these linguis:c counterfactuals at all. 
For example, if “there are dogs” had expressed a falsehood, what claim would it have expressed? Would 
it s:ll have expressed a true claim? There are many different scenarios where some sequence of symbols 
like “ ” fails to express a truth and it’s not at all clear that the closest such worlds are ones in 
which “ ” even has anything to do with mathema:cs. This brings us to a second problem. 
The problem is that we can construct cases where some quirk of history ensures the falsehood of 
the counterfactual in a way that does nothing to generate an intui:ve access worry or any kind of 
problem with posi:ng knowledge. For example, it’s been argued that medieval science oxen expected 
deep analogies between different domains, so that very different things (personality types, metals, 
planets, mythical Greek gods) which somehow par:cipated in the nature of Neptune would behave 
analogously. Imagine a possible world where analogous theories were developed for astrology and 
fledgling chemistry (and each had a special nota:on) such that there was a fairly simple correspondence 
between sentences expressing (supposed) truths of the astrological theory and those expressing 
(supposed) truths of the chemical theory in the year 800 CE. Now suppose that because of these 
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analogies, some monas:c copying error swapped the symbols used to express chemical reac:ons and 
astrological claims so that ” went from originally expressing an astrological claim 
(say, the proposi:on that male Leos and female Libras are roman:cally linked when Mars is entering 
Scorpio) to expressing the claim that it expresses in normal English. And suppose that chemistry and 
astrology developed separately in the years axer 800, with both con:nuing to enjoy great popularity. We 
can imagine a chemist who has (intui:vely) jus:fied beliefs about chemistry and unjus:fied beliefs about 
astrology. Plausibly, some of the closest possible worlds to this one where ” fails 
to express a truth would be ones where this copying error never happened (rather than the very remote 
ones in which the chemical reac:ons proceed differently). In such worlds, the above sentence will 
express a widespread and a long-standing, but false, doctrine about astronomy, which our horoscope-
reading chemist also accepts. Thus, it won’t be the case that had various chemical sentences not 
expressed a truth, she wouldn’t have believed them. Yet intui:vely our chemist could qualify as having 
chemical proposi:ons actually expressed by these sentences. Thus, we seem to have a counterexample 
to . 
This final problem is only heightened if we try to avoid trivializing explana:ons (like the Roman 
numerals example discussed above) by strengthening our reliability requirements. For doing this only 
increases the risk of demanding too much, i.e., that Linnebo’s condi:onal  could fail for reasons (like 
the chancy chemical-astrological symbol swap) that do nothing to impugn our claims to knowledge of a 
given domain. Thus, there’s no plausible interpreta:on of Linnebo’s  which lets us avoid both 
trivializa:on worries and appeal to a sensi:vity principle which we have independent reason for 
doub:ng. 
Stepping back for a moment, I think the core problem for this proposal is the same one that 
generates trivializing answers to the other formula:ons of the access problem above. The realist can 
almost always explain a given fact  about human mathema:cal accuracy if they are allowed to assume
—and use unexplained—every other fact about the match between human psychology and objec:ve 
mathema:cal reality which they believe in. But such explana:ons won’t sa:sfy access worriers because 
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doing this amounts to showing that the existence of one prima facie mysterious match between human 
psychology and objec:ve mathema:cal fact is unsurprising given the existence of another such match. In 
the current case, it seems that no explana:on which brutely appeals to the fact that people got 
mathema:cs right at some earlier :me, e.g., when we were using Roman numerals, cuts ice with regard 
to assuaging intui:ve access worries. Yet invoking such facts seems quite relevant and useful in 
explaining why the closest possible worlds where “ ” expresses a different (false) proposi:on 
are ones in which we don’t accept “ .” 
I read philosophers like Clarke-Doane as, in effect, sugges:ng that such trivializing explana:ons 
pose a dilemma for the access worrier. Either the access worrier abandons Field’s ambi:on of loca:ng a 
tension within the mathema:cal realist’s own worldview  or they allow the realist to explain one 23
seemingly mysterious match between human psychology and objec:ve mathema:cal facts which they 
believe in by appeal to another (since belief in these other apparent coincidences is, axer all, part of the 
mathema:cal realist’s worldview). Thus, it might seem that the access problem is, ul:mately, an illusion. 
However, we can :dily avoid both horns of the dilemma by rejec:ng the hidden premise that 
access worries are simply a maMer of realists’ inability to explain some reliability fact . Below I will argue 
for the following picture (which we get by taking Field’s informal version of the access problem seriously). 
Access Problems aren’t a maMer of realists’ inability to provide any explana:on for some fact. Instead, 
they arise from the interac:on between realists’ intui:ons about what kinds of explana:ons certain facts 
cry out for (i.e., intui:ons about coincidence which they share with an:realists) and the (disappoin:ng) 
nature of the explana:ons the realist can provide. 
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If the access worrier does this, they can reject trivializing explana:ons as employing premises which 23
beg the ques:on against skep:cs about mathema:cal realism like themselves. But this comes at a very 
serious cost. For it’s no longer clear that they have located a problem for mathema:cal realism, as 
opposed to merely showing the possibility for internally coherent doubt about some por:on of the 
things which the mathema:cal realists believes, i.e., merely showing that mathema:cal realism is not 
indubitable (something nearly all contemporary philosophers would be happy to grant since the 
doctrine that knowledge requires indubitability is widely rejected).
4. A coincidence avoidance approach to access worries 
4.a Field’s core idea and general norms of coincidence avoidance 
In view of the problems for spelling out (or replacing) Field’s explanandum R discussed above, I propose 
that we s:ck to Field’s ini:al characteriza:on of the access problem in terms of general norms of 
coincidence avoidance, rather than trying to specify any single reliability fact, such that merely explaining 
this fact (from more general premises which the realist believes) would suffice to answer access worries. 
We should, instead, simply say something like the following. A realist theory of some domain of 
inves:ga:on (such as mathema:cs or morals) faces an access problem to the extent that accep:ng it 
commits one to posi:ng a certain kind of coincidental match between human beliefs and the facts about 
that domain, but prevents one from giving any explana:on which would remove this appearance of 
coincidence. A liMle more formally, a realist theory faces an access problem to the extent that: 
Combining this theory with uncontroversial claims about the extent of human accuracy 
about the domain in ques:on forces us to posit some coincidental match between human 
beliefs and belief-independent facts (a match which intui:vely “cries out for explana:on,” 
but has no explana:on). 
When this holds, it would seem that we have a significant (if defeasible) reason to reject the 
realist theory in ques:on. Such theories are ceterus paribus undesirable in that they commit us to 
posi:ng an extra inexplicable coincidence: a match between human psychology and the realist’s subject 
maMer, which cries out for explana:on but cannot be explained. 
Note that this cons:tutes an internal problem for advocates of the relevant realist theory. For the 
shared norms of coincidence avoidance which we draw on in phrasing access worries are themselves part 
of the realist’s total picture of reality. Thus, (we can con:nue to say that) the realist faces an internal 
tension—in this case, a tension between their philosophical beliefs about some domain and their own 
sense of which kinds of correla:ons cons:tute an unaMrac:ve coincidence.  Also note that, on the view 24
I’m advoca:ng, access worries only give us ceterus paribus reason to reject a given realist theory of some 
domain. If it turns out that all the alterna:ve views which avoid this access problem have worse flaws (as, 
e.g., formalist theories which have trouble capturing proof transcendent truth condi:ons and the role of 
math in the sciences plausibly do), this bullet might be worth bi:ng. 
While, strictly speaking, a theory has an access problem to the extent no sa:sfactory explana:on 
of the match between beliefs and belief-independent facts is possible, we can some:mes also speak 
loosely and say that a theory faces an access problem when it appears that no such explana:on is 
possible (though, to be pedan:c, it only apparently faces an access problem). When it no longer appears 
that no such sa:sfactory explana:on is possible, we would say that the (apparent) access problem has 
been solved or dissolved. Thus, classical aMempts to eliminate access worries like Modal-Structuralism, 
Quan:fier Variance, Quineinism, and Neo-Fregean view can be seen as aMempts to solve (or par:ally 
solve) the access problem as conceptualized above.  25
4.b Helpful consequences 
Formula:ng Field’s access worry as an applica:on of more general norms of coincidence avoidance has 
two interes:ng and helpful consequences. 
First, this proposal iden:fies access worries with a holis:c problem with the realist’s account and 
thus explains why (as noted above) they can’t be dismissed by explaining one type of accuracy in terms 
of another, equally mysterious, type of accuracy. 
While philosophers like Clarke-Doane represent access worries as presen:ng new evidence, I think they 24
are—like mathema:cal arguments—making an a priori philosophical point (hence presen:ng facts 
which they think an ideal Bayesian agent would already have recognized rather than presen:ng new 
evidence on which such an agent would update). This difference may also help explain the different 
conclusions we reach about intui:vely unsa:sfying explana:ons like TRIV and EV-MOR.
Modal-Structuralism (Hellman 1994), Quan:fier Variance (Hirsch 2010), and Neo-Fregeanism (Wright 25
1983) help answer access worries (as characterized above) by sugges:ng that (almost) any logically 
coherent mathema:cal posits would express truths and thus explaining how any coherent mathema:cal 
beliefs we have correspond to mathema:cal truths; of course, the issue of how we come to have 
coherent mathema:cal beliefs remains.
For, on the view above, (dis)solving one’s access problem requires removing the appearance that 
one is commiMed to posi:ng any extra coincidences. So we can allow that TRIV and EV-MOR do, in some 
sense, explain human possession of true beliefs but s:ll maintain that they are useless in addressing 
access worries because each makes salient appeal to an extra coincidence, which more defla:onary rival 
understandings of mathema:cal/moral prac:ce let us avoid. Specifically, TRIV explains our accuracy 
about realist mathema:cal facts by appealing to an unexplained coincidental-seeming match between 
our mathema:cal reasoning method (our acceptance of sentences in  as something like mathema:cal 
axioms) and realist mathema:cal facts. And EV-MOR only explains our good intui:ons about morality by 
appealing to an unexplained match between game-theore:c op:mality and objec:ve moral facts. 
Second, this approach suggests an important way in which access worries can be a maMer of 
degree. While a philosophical theory either does or doesn’t allow for an explana:on of  or  (and 
thus does or doesn’t face an access problem), on this approach, one theory can be preferred to another 
as it requires accep:ng fewer coincidences. 
Because of this compara:ve element, we should not think of access worries as invoking an 
epistemic requirement to “consign to the flames” every theory that posits a coincidence (analogous to 
Hume’s famous empiricist exhorta:on to reject all concepts that weren’t suitably related to experience 
[2007)]). Instead, access worriers appeal to general norms in favor of reducing the number of 
coincidences one is commiMed to posi:ng, insofar as this is compa:ble with other epistemic goals. 
This is important and helpful because it means that, even if our knowledge of induc:ve 
generaliza:on raises an access problem in its own right (maybe even an insoluble access problem), we 
can s:ll invoke induc:ve generaliza:on to dispel our access worries regarding a domain like mathema:cs 
(as no rival theory would dispel the coincidence that the future seems to behave like the past). Thus, 
theories can suffer access worries to varying degrees depending on the number and implausibility of the 
coincidences they are commiMed to posi:ng. 
4.c Do we owe a further analysis of coincidence? 
This way of understanding access worries can seem to require using an unacceptably imprecise no:on of 
coincidence avoidance. However, the same imprecise no:on already plays an important role in scien:fic 
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and philosophical reasoning. 
We clearly have a prac:ce of dis:nguishing certain parts of a theory as unaMrac:ve coincidences. 
And we take commitment to any such extra coincidences to be a (ceterus paribus) reason to disfavor a 
theory. Think of the kind of argument we might use to convince someone to stop believing in the Loch 
Ness monster. We generally wouldn’t be able to derive the nonexistence of the monster from beliefs we 
share with the Loch Ness conspiracy theorist or locate a literal contradic:on within their beliefs. Rather, 
we would point out unaMrac:ve extra coincidences that the Loch Ness monster theory has to admit (the 
monster never shows up when someone has a really good camera, it only appears in pictures which 
could plausibly be faked, etc.) but can’t elegantly explain. We would appeal to a kind of shared general 
epistemic norm, which says that one has ceterus paribus reason to avoid theories which posit certain 
kinds of (inexplicable) coincidences. What results isn’t a deduc:on that the Loch Ness monster doesn’t 
exist, but, rather, ceterus paribus reasons for disfavoring its existence. 
AdmiMedly, what makes something a coincidence is rather complicated.  Coincidences aren’t 26
just facts posited by a theory which would otherwise be assigned low probability given the rest of a 
theory. For example, any par:cular long sequence of outcomes of a coin toss is unlikely, but we don’t 
take total theories of the world which include the results of past coin tosses to be commiMed to an extra 
unaMrac:ve coincidence.  Nonetheless, sposng and rejec:ng such coincidences plays an important role 27
in scien:fic and commonsense reasoning,  even when we can’t appeal to anything like a general 28
Carnapian logic of induc:on. We might wish to have a :dy and uncontroversial criterion for when a 
theory counts as posi:ng extra coincidences. However, we are all commiMed to using this kind of 
reasoning all the :me on a “know it when you see it” basis. Thus, it seems reasonable to take these 
intui:ons about theore:cal badness at face value. 
See Lando (2016) and Bhogal (Forthcoming) for some examples of recent work on this project.26
The feeling of coincidence/crying out for explana:on seems related to an intui:on that some other 27
theory predic:ng the same things but with fewer dimensions of freedom should exist, but the ques:on 
of a priori theory plausibility is an infamously hard one and I won’t speculate about this more here.
For example, the clustering of the orbits of many trans-Neptunian objects has lead astronomers to 28
hypothesize the existence of a ninth planet orbi:ng beyond 200 AU (Wikipedia 2016).
5. Objec1ons 
5.a Tractability 
Let me conclude by addressing two objec:ons. The first objec:on concerns the tractability of disputes 
concerning access problems. Many philosophers currently disagree about how much of an access worry 
various forms of realism about mathema:cs, morals, etc. face. 
In this paper, I have argued that cri:cs of mathema:cal/moral realism can reasonably ar:culate 
and press an access worry by appealing to shared intui:ve norms of coincidence avoidance while taking a 
“know it when we see it” astude to the relevant concept of coincidence, rather than providing any 
explicit theory of what it takes for something to be an unaMrac:ve coincidence. 
But one might fear that adop:ng this posi:on makes disputes about the access problem deeply 
intractable by lesng access worriers issue their challenge from an unassailable swampland of brute 
intui:ons without commisng themselves to any general theses which the realist could defend 
themselves by aMacking. 
However, I will argue that such pessimism is unwarranted because there are other credible ways 
in which debate about access worries can be carried out, and by which widespread philosophical 
agreement could plausibly be produced. 
On one hand, realists can reasonably hope to win over opponents by providing a suitable sample 
explana4on for our accuracy about the relevant domain which suffices to banish coincidences (or only 
employs coincidences which an:realists about the relevant domain are also commiMed to accep:ng). I 
propose such a story in “Not Companions in Guilt (2018) and “The Residual Access Problem 
(Forthcoming). 
Conversely, there are also credible paths to philosophical agreement that there is a genuine 
access problem for realism about a given domain. For example, a history of massive effort and con:nued 
failure to discover any plausible explana:on of a certain coincidence can itself gradually increase access 
worries on my account. Thus, this way of formula:ng the access problem provides a way for access 
worries to get worse and a way for them to get beMer. 
5.b Coincidences involving necessary truths 
The second (and final) objec:on I want to consider concerns the reliability of our intui:ons about 
coincidences and coincidence avoidance in domains involving necessary truths. 
One might imagine the philosophers like Jus:n Clarke-Doane (2017) who have pressed trivializing 
responses to the access problem responding to my proposal as follows.  They might allow the above 29
general point about the general legi:macy and usefulness of coincidence-avoidance intui:ons but 
suggest (perhaps partly on the basis of mathema:cal access worriers’ failure to cash out their intui:ve 
appeals to coincidence avoidance in other terms) that something special goes wrong when we apply 
these intui:ons to evalua:ng whether mathema:cal realists face an access problem. Specifically, one can 
think of them as sugges:ng that (either) our coincidence-avoidance intui:ons about which correla:ons 
involving necessary truths “cry out for explana:on” are deeply unreliable, or that (appearances 
 Clarke-Doane (2017) proposes that access worries cannot call into doubt the safety or sensi:vity of a 29
realist’s beliefs if the realist can explain the safety and sensi:vity of her beliefs from other premises she 
accepts. 
However, I would argue the mere fact that a web of belief contains elements that imply/explain 
the safety and sensi:vity of some faculty/belief-forming mechanism, doesn’t prevent this web of beliefs 
from having other features which call this safety and sensi:vity into doubt. For example, I might have a 
great story (involving op:cs, brain processing, etc.) about how using my eyes and memory provided me 
with many safe and sensi:ve beliefs about Jane’s office, so this aspect of my total picture of myself may 
look great. But if my other beliefs imply that the air in Jane’s room contains a hallucina:on-inducing 
drug which would interfere with this belief-forming mechanisms, this will give me reason to doubt both 
the truth of my beliefs about Jane’s room and their safety and sensi:vity. My ability to provide a (so to 
speak) “locally” internally coherent explana:on for how my beliefs about Jane’s room are safe and 
sensi:ve doesn’t mean that I shouldn’t doubt this safety and sensi:vity because, among other things, it 
doesn’t imply that my total web of beliefs is free of tensions. 
And, on the picture I have painted above, access worriers feel something similar is going on with 
the realist who explains her moral reliability via EV-MOR or her mathema:cal reliability via TRIV. The 
premises which the realist believes and uses in EV-MOR or TRIV provide a good explana:on for our 
reliability about realist morals/mathema:cs if they are true. But this fact alone doesn’t guarantee that 
other elements within her total web of beliefs (such as norms that we should minimize our commitment 
to posi:ng certain kinds of inexplicable coincidence) can’t give her reason to doubt these premises. 
notwithstanding) all such cries for explana:on can be adequately answered by just by “stapling together” 
two unrelated explana:ons for each half of the coincidence (as these trivializing explana:ons do). 
However, I think this line is hard to maintain. First, trivializers haven’t presented much reason for 
thinking that analyzing the no:on of coincidence avoidance in cases where both sides of the relevant 
coincidence are con:ngent truths is any easier. No substan:ve (informa:ve) analysis of what it takes for a 
con:ngent regularity to cry out for explana:on is widely accepted. And there are plenty of good 
paradigms for thinking about coincidence avoidance which apply equally to necessary and con:ngent 
regulari:es (e.g., one might relate coincidence avoidance to a preference for theories that have fewer 
degrees of freedom or a general scien:fic desideratum to favor theories that unify [Kitcher 1981]). 
Second, and more importantly, saying that our intui:ons about coincidence avoidance become 
incoherent when applied to necessary truths seems to conflict with exis:ng mathema:cal methodology. 
For mathema:cians seem to fruicully use explana:on seeking and coincidence avoidance intui:ons 
(including the intui:on that merely “stapling together” two unrelated, but modally robust, explana:ons 
for each half of an apparent coincidence is unsa:sfactory) to guide research (Baker 2009; Lange 2010). 
The history of John Conway’s “Monsterous Moonshine” conjecture provides a drama:c illustra:on of 
this. It shows how discovering a rela:onship between pure mathema:cal facts which intui:vely “cries out 
for explana:on,” and, then, seeking such an explana:on can lead to important discoveries even when a 
proof of both facts already exists. 
In this episode, mathema:cians no:ced that the same number— —appeared in two 
seemingly unconnected areas of mathema:cs. It appeared both as one of the dimensions of the monster 
group (the largest of the sporadic simple groups) and as the first nontrivial coefficient of the -func:on 
(an important func:on in number theory). Later mathema:cians discovered further that the second 
nontrivial coefficient of the -func:on was the sum of the first three special dimensions of the monster 
group.  
Despite the lack of prior reason to believe that there was any connec:on between these two 
areas of mathema:cs, the fact that these coincidences seemed to call out for explana:on mo:vated 




mathema:cal insights. Mathema:cians thought there must be some further explana:on for the above 
regularity involving necessary truths on both sides (and they turned out to be right)  (Klarreich 2017). 
So I think considering mathema:cal cases like the one above tells strongly against any sugges:on 
that our intui:ons about coincidence avoidance become (generally) unreliable when applied to necessary 
truths. Similarly, in philosophy, we seem happy to accept that avoiding coincidence in the sense of 
favoring theories that unify many explana:ons with few resources. 
And proponents of trivializing explana:on like Clarke-Doane haven’t shown that there’s any 
principled and theore4cally aKrac4ve line which carves off the specific intui:ons about coincidence 
avoidance and necessary truths which he wants us to be suspicious of (those driving access worries) from 
general methods of reasoning which are aMrac:ve and ubiquitous in philosophy and mathema:cs. 
Therefore, absent a stronger argument that such reasoning leads us astray, I don’t see any reason to 
eschew its use.  30
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I discussed a trivializa:on problem for Hartry Field’s formal characteriza:on of the access 
Now one might further ask: Is there any mathema:cal precedent/analog for the access worrier’s overall 30
sugges:on that norms of coincidence avoidance should mo:vate us to reject an antecedently aMrac:ve 
metaethical theory, such as realism? Can recognizing a mathema:cal regularity’s cries for an explana:on 
ever make it ra:onal to reject a previously aMrac:ve theory? (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for 
sugges:ng this ques:on.) 
Perhaps Gödel’s idea that new axioms for set theory can be jus:fied by what they let us explain 
about known results suggests one possible example of such a scenario. He writes, “There might exist 
axioms so abundant in their verifiable consequences, shedding so much light upon a whole field, and 
yielding such powerful methods for solving problems . . . that, no maMer whether or not they are 
intrinsically necessary, they would have to be accepted at least in the same sense as any well-
established physical theory” (1947). 
For imagine a case where some proposed new axiom extending ZF set theory is known to be 
incompa:ble with some other axiom we are now moderately aMracted to (e.g., some large cardinal 
axiom are known to be incompa:ble with the axiom of Choice [Kunen 2017]). And suppose it turned out 
that (analogous to what we seem to find regarding the access problem) the new axiom explained many 
“coincidences” as striking as the magic moonshine example above, and we (somehow) had reason to 
think that we could not sa:sfyingly explain these coincidences if the new axiom was false. In this case, 
we’d seem to have a very strong form of the kind of explanatory benefit Gödel endorses. So I think (if 
one is sympathe:c to the Gödelian idea at all) it’s quite conceivable that mathema:cians could reject an 
antecedently aMrac:ve principle on the basis of intui:ons about coincidence avoidance. However, I 
admit that it’s hard to imagine what strong evidence that some axiom is necessary to explain some 
known regularity could look like.  So I wouldn’t be surprised if no such case can be found in the actual 
history of mathema:cs.
problem for realist theories of mathema:cs, morals, and the like. I argued that various aMempts to fix 
this problem by beMer specifying a reliability fact, , which the realist is challenged to explain, fail. 
I then suggested a reason for this failure: all such “single explanandum” accounts (in effect) get 
the logical structure of the access problem wrong. They aMribute the access worrier an “ ” intui:on, 
that some par:cular apparent coincidence can’t be explained by any realist account of human 
mathema:cal/moral accuracy (even a bump-pushing one). But what actually drives the access worry is a 
“ ” intui:on that (while it’s usually easy to explain one mysterious predes:ned harmony by posi:ng 
another) every realist account of human mathema:cal/moral accuracy would leave some mysterious 
coincidence unexplained. 
Accordingly, I argued that access worriers would do beMer to s:ck closer to Field’s informal 
statements. They should cash out access worries in terms of the realist’s apparent commitment to some 
coincidence involving human accuracy about realist moral, mathema:cal, etc. facts. And they should 
reject demands for informa:ve further analysis of what qualifies as a coincidence. Because of the good 
work which this no:on of coincidence reduc:on already does in mathema:cs and the sciences, it is 
something to which all par:es in debate are commiMed. Finally, I noted that we don’t need to go beyond 
this unambi:ous way of formula:ng access worries in order to resolve debate about them. 
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